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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRINCF~-COVEY & COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaint if f-Rcs pondent, 
vs. 
JJDRRY V. STRAND, 
Def cndant-Appclla11 t. 
Case No. 
12964 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Prince-Covey & Company, Inc. 
NATURE OF THE CASl~ 
Respondent, tht• plaintiff bdo\1', hrought a contract 
action for damages sustained by it when Appellant failed 
to pay for sPcurities ordered by h!m and 1•11rchased 
for his account h~r Respondent. 
DISPOSl TION IN THl~ L(}WER COFR'I' 
A nonjury trial was held in the District Court of 
thP 1'hi rd Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the llonornble D. Frank Wilkins presiding. The Trial 
('omt granted to Plaintiff-Respondent Judgment in the 
amount of $3-1-,696.16. The Trial Court determined that 
1fospondent had suffered damages in the amount of 
$37,4:15.84 based upon the difference between the amount 
1 
which Respondent had paid for securities acquired at 
Appellant's request and for his account, and the amount 
Respondent realized from the sale of these securities 
(without deduction of commissions) when Appellant fail-
ed to pay for them. From this total damage figure, the 
Trial Court deducted the sum of $6,430 representing 
damages suffered by Appellant when Respondent, with-
out Appellant's consent, sold fully paid-for S<'curitil'~ 
from AppPllant 's account. The damage of $6,430 repre-
sented the difference between the fair market value 
of the converted secmities, as found by the Trial 
Court, within .a reasonable period of time after the date 
of conversion, and the actual amount realized by Re-
spondent from the sale of such stock and credited to Ap-
pellant's ae:count. To the resulting total judgment in the 
sum of $31,005.84, the Trial Court added costs and inter-
est at the rate of 6% per annum from May 14, 1970, in 
the amount of $3,690.32. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court reversing 
the award of damages to Appellant or, in the alternative, 
modifying the amount of damages awarded to .Ap-
pellant by virtue of the conversion of Appellant's 
fully paid securities. In all other respects, Respond-
ent requests that this Court affirm the judgment 
of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'l1S 
Respoudent, a Utah corpora tlon, is a licensed broker· 
dPaler which buys and sells securities through interstate 
2 
('ummerce (Record, pp. 13:>-3G). Sometimes in late 1969 
' 
Appellant opened a special cash account with Respond-
Pnt (Rel'ord, p. 136). Appellant placed orders with 
Respondent for the purchase and sales of various secnri-
tiPs and Respondent executed such orders until Mav 18 . ' 
1970 (I~xhibits 1-P and 2-D, and Record, pp. 136, 201 
and 239.) 
Appellant's account was intially handled in such 
a way as to require payment, pursuant to· Federal Regu-
lations, within seven business days of the date of pur-
chati1~ (Record, p. 139). In April of 1970, Appellant 
indicated to Respondent's agent, Keith Sudbury, that he 
would like to have future purchase transactions effected 
with the understanding that payment would be made on 
dE'livery of the stock certificates ( Record, pp. 140 and 
141). Pursuant to this request, Respondent so treated 
purchase transactions after April 10, 1970 (Recorded, 
p. 144). 
Between the dates of April 10, 1970 and 1\fay 18, 
1970, the Appellant gave to Respondent various orders 
for thl" purchase of securities for Appellant's account 
with tlw understanding that payment would be made 
on delivery of the stock certificates (Record, p. 144). 
Within 24 hours after each such transaction Respondent 
t;ent to Appellant at an address furnished by Appellant 
a written confirmation of the transaction by U. S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, and as the securities purchased arrived 
RPspond,mt specifically identified them as belonging to 
ApJH'llant by placing said securities in a special folder 
(Reeord, p. 223). At no time did Appellant send to 
3 
Respondent a written objedion to the contents of am 
of the aforesaid confirmations (Record, pp. 222 and 23:-l). 
At all times prior to ~Iay 15, 1970, Appellant 
promptly paid for securitit's as the same were received 
by Respondent and delivered (Record, pp. 1-1:2 and HJ). 
On or about May 15, 1970, securities purchased by RP-
spondent for Appellant's account pursuant to Appc•J. 
lant's instructions were received by Respondent, arnl 
Appellant, having been notified of this fact, deliven'd 
to Respondent a check in the amount of $16,095 (Record, 
pp. 145, 199 and 234). On or about May 19, 1970, Re-
spondent was notified by its bank that Appellant's check 
had failed to clear his bank because of insufficient fnncl~ 
(RPcord, p. 199). 
(h ~Iay 19, 1970, Respondent began liquidation of 
the trmrnactions by selling the securities for which 
Appellant had not paid when delivery was kndered 
(Reconl, p. 145). Then~after, as promptly as possible, 
Res1Jondent liquidated each transaction in Appellant'o 
aC('Otmt hy selling the securities in an attempt to reduce 
tlw nnpairl halance of this account (Record, pp. 145 and 
1-!7). As of May 18, 1970, the debit balance in Appf'l-
lant's aceoant was $100,702.8-! (Record, pp. 201 and 202). 
From ::\Ia;,- 18 to .Tmw 18, 1970, Respondent realized the 
sum of ~;63,267.00 without deduction of commissions, 
throngh liqnidation of the Apywllant's aeconnt 10aving n 
ha1nnce of $37,-+35.~-t (H('f'(ffd, p. 203.) 1 
iMr. David Nelson testified that tl~e :;iccount was reducedir:o 
$40 542 58 but the Trial Court reduced this figure by $3,106:74 re] d 
senting. commissions earned by Respondent upon the sales mvolve · 
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l!l(·]ucled in Aprwllant's account were certain securi-
tiPs for which Appellant had paid but which were still 
being held by Responcl<>nt (Record, p. 233). Despite 
testimony by Respondent's agent to the effect that these 
st>curities were held as security for the faithful perform-
ance by AppPllant of the credit arrangements (Record, 
p. 18:3), the '!'rial Court fou11c1 that these securities 
were conYertrd \\"hen the same were sold by Re-
spon(1Pnt. The amounts realized therefrom were credited 
to Appllant's account (RPcord, p. 78). Appellant testi-
fied that the fair market value of said stocks within two 
1n•eks from the commencement of the liquidation was 
$16,980 (Record, p. 235). Offsetting this claim, Re-
:-;pond<>nt, punmant to Appellant's instructions, sold 
$5,2-l:O worth of these securities and puid Appellant this 
amount, lc•ss commissions of $152.50, in rash on l\Iay 18, 
1070. (Record, p. 242), In addition, as the remaining por-
tion of these stocks were liquidated, Respondent credited 
Appellant's account with amounts realized totalling 
$6,221 (Record, p. 129 and Exhibit 7-P). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE THE EXISTENCE OF AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN IT AND APPELLANT, 
AND THE BREACH THEREOF. 
'l'hPre can he no question that Appellant had an 
ac·count for the purchase and sale of securities at Re-
spondent's brokerage house. Appellant admits this fact 
on page 35 of his brief. The crux of Appdlant's argu-
5 
ment in Point I of his brief appears to be that a com. 
prehensive understanding as to how the account would 
be handled if the customer fails to pay is an indispens 
able part of any contract for the sale or purchase of 
securities and the absence of such an understandin11 
t 
renders the contract incomplete and void. In addition, 
Appellant appears to be arguing that regardless of the 
merit of the foregoing proposition, Respondent had no 
authority to handle the account in the manner in which 
it was handled. The record contains persuasive evidence 
supporting the Trial Court's conclusions on both of 
these points. 
'l'he absmdiiy of the first proposition is obvious. 
The entire contract involved in the instant r...a.se wa1 
that Respondent would purchase securities in a~ord­
ance with Appellant's orders and Appellant would pay 
for them. Appellant admitted in paragraph 2 of the 
Second Def ens(' of his Answer, and has never taken a 
position to the contrary, that he ordered securities and 
that he failed to pay for them when payment became 
due (Rerord, p. 54). 
The case of Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Purkitt. 82 
Cal Rptr. :210, 1 Cal App. 3rd 968 (1969), involved a 
similar failure on the part of the customer to pay for 
securities he had ordered. The defendant there argued 
that tlw contract involved an understanding as to h011 
the account would he handled in the event of a failun 
to pay. The California Court of Appeals, in holding for 
the hroker, said: 
6 
"In our case the entire contract was that 
plaintiff would sell stock to defendants and de-
fendants would pay for it. Performance of the 
agreement required no other action by either 
party. Liquidation of thP debt in the event of 
defendant's default was no part of the agreement. 
Plaintiff did not agree to sell the stock after 
seven days, or at all. Its duty in that respect was 
imposed by the regulation .... " Supra, p. 216. 
The answer to Appellant's second proposition is 
equally clear although it will involve more explanation. 
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C:. ~~ 78a, et seq., prohibits securities brokers and 
dealers from extending credit to any customer in con-
travention of rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal ResPrVP System.2 
Regulation T, 12 C.F.R., ~ 220.1, et seq., was pronrnl-
gated by the Federal Reserve System's Board of Gov-
ernors pursuant to § 7 and provides, in pertinent part of 
§ 4 thereof, as follows: 
" ( c) Special cash account.-( 1) In a special 
cash account, a creditor may effect for or with 
any customer bona fide cash transactions in secur-
ities in which the creditor may: 
(i) Purchase any security for, or sell 
any security to, any customer, provided, 
funds sufficient for the purpose are already 
held in the account or the purchase or sale 
is in reliance upon an agreement accepted by 
the creditor in good faith that the customer 
will promptly make full cash payment for 
the security and that the cust01_ner do.es not 
contemplate selling the secunty prior to 
making such payment. 
215 U.S.C. § 78g, as amended July 29, 1968, PL. 90-437, 82 Stat. 
452. 
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(2) In case a customer purchases a security 
(other than an exempted security) in the special 
cash account and does not make full cash payment 
for the security within 7 days after the date on 
which the security is so purchased, the creditor 
shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (3)-
(7) of this paragraph, promptly cancel or other-
wise liquidate the transaction or the unsettled 
portion thereof. 
(5) If the creditor, acting in good faith in 
accordance with subparagraph (1) of this para-
graph, purchases a security for a customer, or 
sells a security to a customer, with the under-
standing that he is to deliver the security 
promptly to the customer, and the full cash pay-
ment to be made promptly by the customer is t0 
be made against such delivery, the creditor 11m 
at his option treat the transaction as one to which 
the period applicable under subparagraph (2) 
of this paragraph is not the 7 days therein speci-
fied hut ;35 clays after the date of such purchase 
or sale. 
( 7) The 7-day periods specified in this para-
graph refer to 7 full business clays. The 35-day 
period ... refers to calender days, but if the last 
day of a11y such period is a Saturday, Sunday, or 
holiday, such period shall be considered to end 
on the next full business day. For the purposes 
of this paragraph, a creditor may, at his option, 
ilisreo-ard any sum due by the customer not ex-a . 
ceeding $100." (Emphasis added) 
Seclion :~ of tl1e Ht•gulatiou, 12 C.F.R. § 220.:3(a), 
requires all finan<'i al r<'la ti ons hehn'Pn a. hrnker nn:l 
its custonwr to lw handled in a ''g<'neral a('connt'' with 
the exception of t11ose transactions s1wcifieally author-
ized to he hand!Pd in one or more "special acc01mt:-:" 
8 
provich·d for in ~ 4. Special account transa0tions must 
Jw conducted in strict compliance with the terms and 
<'onditions set forth in~ 4 or a violation of Regulation T 
oc·nirs. It is conceded hy Appellant that all transactions 
between Respondent and Appellant were handled in 
n spe('ial cash account. Brief for Appellant, State-
n!l'11t of Facts, p. 5; Record, p. 136. Section 4(a) (2) 
stat<·s that, "Each ... special account shall be recorded 
sPp~uatPly and shall be confined to the transactions 
and rdations specifically authorized for such account . 
. . . " Appellant's account at Respondent's brokerage 
homw was re>ceiwd into evidence as Exhibit 1-P. Reeord, 
p. 172. 
Tlw "cash account" (technically termed the "special 
eash account") described in the Regulation is one in 
which the customer is extended credit ·where transactions 
are pffoctPd with the understanding that they will be 
settl<'cl vromptly. 220.4(c) (1) (i), supra, p. 7. The 
meaning of the word "promptly" is that these transac-
tions will hP sP'ttlPd within the two or threP days re-
qnir<>d hy use of th<> usual transmittal fa<'ilities. See 
Jl<'llloran<lnm of the Board of (foyernors, 12 C.F.R. Reg. 
:2:20.+ ( <'). T n any event, full cash paymrnt must he made 
within 7 days afte>r the date of purchase>. 
Tlic're: is an exception in the special cash account pro-
Yision:-; of RPgulation T pursuant to which, if a purchase 
if' madP by a customer with the understanding that 
payrnPnt is to be made on delivery, the broker/dealer 
ma~'. ot his ovtion and acting in good faith, treat the 
transaction as onP in which the applicable period of 
time for payment is not 7 full husiness davs but •)· 
• u.i 
calendar clays.§ 220.4(c)(5) and (7), snpra, p. 7. In 
such a purchase transaction, the hroker/dPaler has thi· 
obligation to deliver and obtain payment as soon a1 
possible but since a purchased security might not Jw 
delivered to the broker within a 7-day period, the period 
within which delivery must be made to the customer 
and payment must be macle to the hroker is extended to 
not more than 35 days. Upon request of Appellant, and 
in light of his excellent record of payment for securitiri 
purchased (Record, p. 142) and because of the size of 
his account (Record, pp. 138 and 139), he was infonned 
on or about April 10, 1970 that future transactions in 
his account could be paid for upon delivery to him by 
Respondent of the securities purchased, or on a C.0.D. 
basis (Record, p. 156). For the period from then until 
l\Iay 15, 1970, Appellant complied with the C.O.D. 
arrangement (Record, p. 144), and paid promptly upon 
delivery of the purchased securities. (Record, pp. 143 
and 144). 
It should be noted that the 7-day maximum payment 
period undPr Regulation T is applicable to all transac· 
tions except those where the broker elects to treat the 
transacton as one to which the applicable period is 35 
davs and that the broker can only extend credit (whether 
fo; up to 7 or up to 35 days) if the broker in good faith 
believes that the customer will promptly make full cash 
payment l1pon delivery. § 220.4(c) (5), supra, p. 7. 
This "O"ood faith" rPquirement is for the purpose of 
b . 
prohibiting an extension of crPdit in any transaction 
where the broker-dealPr knows the customer may not 
10 
he able to pay. In short, the broker is prohibited from 
effecting any fnrther purchases for a customer who the 
broker, iu good faith, does not believe can pay, and addi-
tionally the broker is prohibited from continuing to 
extend credit with regard to previous purchases for 
which payment has not been made. The broker must 
recPiw payment immediately or he must promptly cancel 
or otherwise liquidate the transaction or transactions. 
In Matter of Naftalin d'; Company, Inc., CCH Feel. 
See. L. Hep. 92,995 (8th Cir., Nov. 29, 1972, certain 
broker/dealer creditors of a bankrupt broker/dealer 
(N aftalin) appealed from a district court decision hold-
ing that these creditors had violated Regulation T and 
directing the bankruptcy Referee to ddenuine ,.,-hat 
these creditors' claims would have amounted to if the 
transactions with Naftalin had been liquidated in com-
pliance with the Regulation. Naftalin had special cash 
accounts with some 27 broker/dealers and for some pe-
riod of time had been selling stocks to these dealers for 
his own account. Although the Regulation prohibits sales 
for a customer in a specia1 cash account where the 
('Ustorner does not own the security at the time the 
order is placed, N aftalin's usual practice was to place 
orders for the sale of securities which he did not own 
hut looked to purchase at a lower price in the future. 
Over a pE>riod of time preceding the transaction in ques-
tion, N af talin had been very slow in making deliveries 
but he had always given plausible excuses for the delays 
and had always represented to the other dealers that 
he did, in fact, own the securities and that the reasons 
for delay had to do with transfer agents, other brokers 
11 
failing to deliver N aftalin's securities to him, or other 
reasons of this nature. 
In August of 1969 N aftalin placed orders for sales 
of securities in excess of $10,000,000 and when the prices 
of the securities went up by over $1,000,000 he finalh 
confessed that he did not own the securities and could 
not make delivery. During the weeks between the sales 
and the confession, brokers inquired as to when they 
could expect delivery, and N aftalin met these inquirities 
with typically evasive and misleading replies. After the 
confession, the brokers bought-in the undelivered stocks 
at an aggregate cost in excess of $1,285,000. The total 
loss claimed was the difference between this purchase 
price and the original price of the undelivered securities. 
or $653,000. 
Xaftalin claimed that the failure of these creditors 
to comply with section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act 
made the short-selling scheme possible and that they 
should therefore be prohibited from enforcing their con-
tracts. The first violation alleged by N aftalin was that 
the brokers could not "in good faith'' have believed that 
the securities sold would be "promptly" delivered in 
light of N aftalin's past performance. The district court 
decision, rejecting this contention on the grounds that 
the brokers could well have believed that Naftalin owned 
the securities despite his slow deliveries, was affirmed. 
N aftal;n's second argument was that the brokers should 
have promptly liquidated the transactions by repurchas-
ing the sold securities when N aftalin did not deliver 
in 7 days. While the court did not entirely agree with 
12 
Xaftalin's position,' it did hold that each transaction 
involwd should have been liquidated at such time as the 
broker involvt'<l no loHger had a good faith assurance 
that the securities sold would be promptly delivered. 
The court stated that, ""We think the broker/dealer is 
under a continwing obligation to maintain a good faith 
assurancP that the sak transaction is, in fact, a bona fide 
t'ash transaction and that the securities sold will be 
promptly delivered." id. at 93,001. (Emphasis added). 
The transactions in the instant case must be divided 
into two categories: namely, the transactions for which 
cleliwry to Appellant \Vas made on May 15, and for 
\\'hich AppPllant was unable to pay and secondly, those 
pmcliase transadions made prior ro :\lay 19, fw cfatP 
upon which Respondent was notifo·d of th<' had check, 
arnl rPlative to ·which the securitle::i purchased had not 
~-et lwen received. Respondent was cornpdlPcl to promptly 
liquidate all securities in the first cafrgor.1· h<~cac!SP 
prompt liquidation is required by tlw clear arnl umnis-
takahle language of Reg.~ 220.4(c)(5). 
With respect to the securities in the second category, 
the plain meaning of subsection ( 5) and the holding of 
tlw Safta1i11 case, supra, p. 11, is that the broker may only 
Pxtend credit until the time of delivery in tho·se cases 
when" thE' brokE'r in good faith believes that the customer 
\\"ill promptly make full cash payment upon such de-
liv<>r:-·. 'J'hns, aftE'r May 19, 1970, Respondent could no 
longPr extend crt>dit on the securities in the second cate-
asection 220.4(c) (2) of the Regulati_on c~ntains ~specific liquida-
tion requirement for purc~as~ tr~nsacho~s _ m special cash acco_unts 
but there is no equivalent hqmdat10n prov1s1on for sales transactions. 
13 
gory because Respondent was now aware of Appellant's 
obvious inability to pay. 
In N af talin, the same rules had to be a pp lied. 
The difference, of course, \ms that in Na/tali n the cu~­
tomer had not promptly delivered securities while in the 
instant case the customer failed to promptly deliver 
payment for securities. The rule in both cases is that 
at the time the broker can no longer believe, in good 
faith, that tlie crnstomer is going to perform promptly, 
the broker must liquidate the transaction. In Naftalin 
the court stated: 
"The good faith of a broker/dealer who has 
originally executed a sell order in compliance 
with Regulaton T must gradually dissipate a~ 
time passes without delivery of the securities ... 
If no credible explanation for the delay is forth-
coming, the transaction must be bought-in imme-
diately." Id. at 93,002. 
ThP difficult task in the Naftalin case was to deter-
mine the point in time when the creditors were re-
quired to take affirmative action. rrhere is no difficulty 
in determining this time in the instant case because the 
minute ~\ppellant's check bounced, Respondent knew 
Appellant could not pay for the purchases involved or 
for any other purchases he had theretofore made. 
Appellant argues that RespondPnt's capital positi'on 
mav have heen "precarious'' and that Respondent eleetetl 
to ."sav<> its mm hide by sacrificing the defendant.'' 
Brief for Appdlant, pp. 17 and 18. It is irrdevant 
whetlier or not the Respondent's capital position was 
14 
precarious m that a failure to liquidate the account 
would have violated Regulation T and would have sub-
jected Respondent to disciplinary proceedings. In the 
Matter of John W. Yeaman, Inc. and John, W. Yeaman, 
SF}C Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7527 (Feb. 
10, 1965), the SEC held that the failure of a broker to 
fa1uidate customer's purchases on a special cash account 
when full payments were not made within 7 days after 
tlu~ execution of the transactions violated Regulation T. 
'l'be Commission stated that it was no excuse for the 
violation that the purchasers were good credit risks. 
See also Maryland Securities Co. Inc. and Morton 
Sandler, 40 SEC 443 (1960). 
For the same reason, there was no requin•ment that 
R(•spondent give nofice to Appellant or that any "reason-
able, good faith effort" be made hy lle:-;pondent to e~'fl'ct 
recovery on the check. Similarly, tlwrP \ms no reqnire-
HH'nt that Respondent obtain Appellant's com;Pnt to the 
liquidation of the various transactions. Appellant's re-
liance upon these argnnients indicates a lack of under-
~tandin o· of the mandatorv nature of Regulation T in b . -
n•qniring prompt liquidation of th<> transaction. 
Appellant eontt•nds that then• was no testimony or 
l'YidPnc'P tliat any stock had h(•t-n delivered to him. The 
'l'rinl Conrt fonnd in Finding of Fact No. 10 that "on 
l\I ay 14, 1970, securities purchasPd by plaintiff for de-
fendant's account pursuant to defendant's instructions 
WPre received by plaintiff, and defendant, having been 
notified of this fact, delivered to plaintiff a check in the 
amount of $16,095'' (Record, p. 77). The securities re-
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ceived on that date were "delivered'' within the rneaninrr 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, ~ 70A-8-313, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, when Respondent, 
upon purchase, sent to Appellant confirmation of the 
purchase and when, on May 14, 1970, Respondent identi-
fied a specific security in Respondent's possession as 
belonging to Appellant (Record, p. 223). As to securi-
ties received after the above date, plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 
indicates the days upon which deliveries of all stock 
certificates were made by virtue of the receipt of the 
same by Respondent and the placing of the same in the 
spe·cial folder maintained for all of Appellant's pur-
chases and sales. 
Appellant attempts to attach some significance to 
tl:e fact that Respondent did not introduce into evidencr 
Pach individud confirmation regarding each purchase 
ancl sak• in A11pellant's account. However, as Appellant 
adrnits (Brief for Appellant, pp. 20 .and 21), it is appar-
ent that Respondent could have provided confirmations 
on Pvery transaction since Respondent files its confir-
mations numerically by transaction number and Re-
spondent's computer run (Exhibit P-1) lists each trans-
action by the transaction number. In addition, the 
computer run contains all the information contained on 
the confirmation slips. Compare Exhibit P-1 with Ex-
hibit P-5. 
Appellant contends that the reason it was necessary 
for Respondent to provide all of the confirmations i~ 
that § 4(a) (2), supra, p. 4, requires that each special 
account must be recorded separately. An examination of 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 indicates that each transactiou 
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wat> rPcorded t>eparately. However, even if thit> were not 
the cat>e it is difficult to understand the thrnst of Ap-
pellant's argument. If that argument is that Respond-
e11t violated Regulation T, the answer is that such a 
Yiolatiou would not bar Respondent's recovery in this 
matter. In E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Weinberg, 151 NYLJ 
No. 40, p. 16, (1964), the New York Supreme Court 
affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in 
favor of a stockbroker in its action against a cus-
tomer on a note signed by the customer to cover 
<leficicncie" in the customer's account. The custo-
mer alleged that the note was unenforceable since the 
underlying transactions were in violation of the Regula-
tion T requirements. The court ruled that the facts, if 
true, of the broker's violation of the Regulation T re-
quirements were not sufficient to bar the broker's 
recovery from the customer. 
In addition, the violation alleged by Appellant re-
sults from Appellant's m~sconception as to the meaning 
of a "special account." The Regulation provides for a 
number of special accounts included among which are a 
special cash account, a special omnibus account, a special 
arbitrage account, and a special commodity account. 
The meaning of the provision cited by Appellant is that 
a brokPr may not record transactions relative to a special 
arbitrage account in the same records as the broker 
l'Pcords transactions relative to the special omnibus 
account. However, all transactions falling within one 
R<'connt are to bt> recorded in the same place. The fact 
is that all transactions handled by Respondent for Appel-
lant were transactions in the special cash account and 
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therefore were requireJ to be ncorded in the same place. 
There is no provision in the special cash account regula-
tious reqniriug recordation of a C.O.D. transaction 
(§ 220.4(c)(5), supra, p. 8), to be made in a different set 
of books from the recorda ti on of a 7-day transaction 
(§ 220.4(c) (2), supra, p. 8) 
There is a similar lack of relevance in Appellant's 
argument that part of Appellant's large debit balanc(' 
was dne to 2,000 shares of Agan which were improperly 
included in Appellant's account. The transactions in-
volving the Appellant's bad che-ck were not liquidated 
because of a large debit balance. They were liquidated 
hecanse of a failure to promptly pay for securities pur-
chased, upon delivery, pursuant to the terms of the 
special cash account rules regarding these transactions. 
Appellant's aecount was debited each time he purchased 
securities but, nntil May 19, 1970, Appellant was not 
obligated to pay for any such purchases until Respond-
ent had recPived the stock certificates from the seller. 
(Brief for Appellant, p. 208). From the foregoing dis-
cussion it should be clear that Respondent not only had 
the authority to handle Appellant's acC'ount in the man-
ner it was handled, it had the affirmative obligation to 
so handle it. 
POINT II 
THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL APPEL-
LANT'S PU R C H A S E TRANSACTIONS 
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF REGULA-
TION T DID NOT RESULT IN A CONVER-
SION OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY. 
Appellant advances a novel theory in Point II of 
his brief. The initial argument contained therein is that 
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Appellant had no obligation to pay for securities pur-
chased until there was an actual delivery of stock cer-
tificates. Appellant thereby confuses the extension of 
credit with a contract obligation to pay for securities 
purc·l1m.;ed. The contract between Appellant and Re-
qwndPnt was that Respondent would purchase securities 
in aceordance with Appellant's orders and that Appel-
lant would pay for them. Supra, p. 6. Appellant ad-
mitt(•cl in the third defense of his Answer that ht> orderecl 
securities from RE'spondent and that he failed to pay 
for them when payment became due. 
From the foregoing invalid proposition and based 
npo11 the 'Trial Court's findings of liability, Appellant 
c-oncludPs that there must haYe bren an actual or con-
structive ddiwry of the stock to the Appellant and that 
it follows that Appellant was the legal owner thereof. 
Apparently the argument is that Appellant became the 
legal owner of the purchased securities at the time the 
conl'innations wPre sent, notwithstanding the fact that 
Appellant never paid for these securities. Finally, 
..-'qi1wllant argues that these sPcurities "o·wned" by him, 
but never paid for by him, were "eonvcrted" by the Re-
spond<·nt and that this conversion resulted in damages 
to Appellant. 
Appellant's theory that securities for which he failed 
to pay were "converted" by Respondent upon liquida-
tion of the transaeti ons i 1ffolved i:s not supported by a 
single ('m;p or statute. 'I'o the contrary, there are a great 
1mrnlH·r of ('ases \Yhere a broker who has liquidnted an 
aeC'()llllt bas snf'd for arn1 rccoYerecl from his customer 
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damages baspd on the d.ilference between the valuP the 
customer agreed to pay [or the securities and the amount 
i'L'<:dize<l upon liquidation. In effect, Regulation T, in 
order to control the extension of credit by broker/dealen 
iu the securities market, creates a security interest 
in the securities purchased for a customer's account and 
compels the broker/dealer to foreclose upon this interest 
by cancelling or liquidating the transaction if payment 
is not promptly made or if the broker/ dealer, acting in 
good faith, can no longer extend credit. 
In Gregory-llf assari, Inc. v. Purkitt, supra, p. 6, a 
registered hroh:er /dealt~!' sued for damages for breacl1 
of contract. The dealer accepted an order from the de-
fendants and sent them a confirmation of the sale. 'l'lw 
confirmation eontained a payment elate in compliance 
"'ith Regulation T. Failing to receive payments, the 
broker sold the securities several months later' at a 
loss and brought an action to recover damages based on 
the difference between the amount realized on sale and 
the original purchase price. The court stated that the 
contract was enterPd into so that thP broker/dealer 
would purchase securities for the defendants and tTw 
defendants would pay for them. Based upon this con-
tract, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause 
of action for damages. Accord. Nichols & Co. v. Col11111-
lnts Credit Corp., 126 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1953) and 
Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenbrrger, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 
(Mun. Ct. 1961). 
"In Gregory-Massari the custo_me~ raised a defens'; bas_ed upon 
the broker's failure to "promptly" hqmdate the_ transac~10ns mbol~~; 
The court allowed an offset based upo:r:i tJ:te higher pnce the f this 
could have obtained had he promptly hqmd~ted. No defende _o f ct 
nature has been raised by Appellant in the mstant case an , m d~ni 
the main thrust of Appellant's arguments seems to be that Respon 
was too prompt in its liquidations. 
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If Appellant were to prevail on his theory, a broker/ 
<kaler liquidating one or more transactions as required 
by Regulation T would always be guilty of a conversion. 
Regulation T would necessarily be invalid for constitu-
tional reasons, and the entire purpose of the Regulation, 
which is to prohibit excessive credit in the stock market, 
would be thwarted. 
Even if the Court were to find that these securities 
were converted, these damages claimed by Appellant 
were nevu· proven and must be computed on the basis 
of values set forth in paragraph 4 of Appellant's coun-
terclaim. 5 The per share values set forth on page 27 
of Ap1)ellant's brief were never offered into evidence. 
Further, if: appears from the testimony that Appellant 
arrived at his figures on value by asking various brokers 
for the value figures. Respondent believes that its hear-
say objections, overruled by the Trial Court, to this testi-
mony on vnlue was well taken. Infra, pp. 22-25. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF $6,430 
DAMAGE TO APPELLANT ON HIS COUN-
TERCLAIM IS EXCESSIVE. 
In his counterclaim, Appellant alleged that certain 
shares of stock for which he had paid in full were in the 
pol'session of Respondent as of the time Appellant's 
ac-connt was liquidated. Appellant further alleges and 
daims that said fully paid shares of stock were sold by 
'Appellant testified that the total value ?f 5 different securities 
for which he had fully paid but which were bemg held by Ri:spondent 
was $16, 980. Record, p. 235. He did not, however, testify as to 
values of individual securities. 
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Respondent without Appellant's consent and without 
authority and that such sales constituted a conversion 
by the Respondent of Appellant's stock resulting in 
damages to Appellant in the amount of $16,605 (Record, 
p. 65). By his testimony, Appellant revised this figure 
to $16,980 (Record, p. 235). On page 30 of his brief, 
Appellant attempts to revi·se the figure again to the 
sum of $17,980 by virtue of adding the "individual fig-
ures pertaining to the stocks in question.'' However, 
Appellant never introduced individual value figures per-
taining to the stocks into evidence and certainly cannot 
be allowed to introduce them on appeal. This Appellant 
attempts to do on page 27 of his brief by copying values 
per share of selected stocks from paragraph 4 of the 
First Cause of Action in his counterclaim. Because of 
the lack of individual stock prices, the only testimony in 
evidence is tha.t the fair market value of the fully paid 
stock converted by Appellant was $16,980 (Record, p. 
235). 
Although Appellant testifiNl that the total value of 
the securitiPs owned by him and 80ld by Respondent 
was $16,980, this evidence should ha \·e been excluded 
by the Trial Court by reason of the fact that it was 
improperly admitted over Appellant's hearsay objection. 
In the cross examination of Appellant, the following 
questions by Respondent's counsel and answers by 
Appellant took place: 
(Q) Now, Mr. Strand, you claim a total value 
of some $16,000 is that correcH 
(A) That is correct. 
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( Q) And that total value is determined how 1 
(A) By the representative prices that these 
stocks traded at within about a two-week 
period. 
( Q) Where did you get the sales prices~ 
(A) From representative brokers on actual trans-
actions, on actual trades. 
Mr. Prince: I object , then, to the whole testi-
mony with regard to the price because I 
object to it as hearsay 
Mr Faber: Your Honor, he can't object at this 
time. He has been querying the witness for 
20 minutes now. Now, he wants to object 
to it. 
Mr. Prince: That's the first time I found out 
where he got them. 
The court : Overruled. 
(Record, pp. 243 and 244) 
An examination of the record will indicate that it 
was n<Yt true that Respondent's counsel had been "query-
ing the witness for 20 minutes" prior to the hearsay 
objection. To the contrary, the above testimony was the 
first time Mr. Strand had disclosed the manner in which 
he determined stock prices. It is the general rule that 
heanmy Pvidence is incompetent and inadmissible to 
establish a fact. 2.9 Am. Jitr. 2nd 551 (Evid. § 493). 
lfrarRay is defined as testimony in court of a statement 
made out of court, such statement being offered as an 
assrrtion to show the truth of matters asserted therein. 
and thus n~sting for its value upon the credibility of 
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the out-of-court asserter. McCormick, Handuook of tlir 
Law of Evidence, Hornuook Series, page 4GO (1954). 
Thus, hearsay is evidence which derives its value not 
solely from the credit to be given to the witness on the 
stand but in part from the veracity and competency 
of some other person. 29 Am. J1tr. 2nd 551 (Evid. ~ J93'i. 
·while the hearsay rnle is subject to a large number 
of exceptions, the hrn underlying reasons for any ex-
ception to the rule are the necessity for the exception and 
the circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of 
the offered evidence. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 
409, 417 (5th Cir., 1954). Neither of the tests were met 
in this case. If Appellant had wished to establish stock 
prices during the period of time following his bounced 
check, he could have easily introduced expert testimony 
to accomplish thi's. Thus, there is no necessity for the 
application of an exception to the rule. In addtiion, the 
fact that Appellant did nO't testify as to any specific 
trades, by offering confirmations of actual sales or an 
expert, casts grave doubts upon the trnstworthisnrss of 
the offered evidence. Finally, it was obviously in Re· 
spondent's best interests to realize as much as possibl1 
from sales of the converted securities. The fact that 
Respondent could only realize the amounts set forth on 
Exhibit 7-P is the best evidence of the actual fair market 
Yalue of the securities as of that time. 
Later, during voir dire examination by his counsel, 
Appellant testified that sales from which he determined 
the price of stock were sales from his account at respond· 
ent 's brokerage house (Record, p. 250). Subsequently, 
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Appellant testified that these were sales from his ac-
count at Parker-Mawood (Record, p. 251). Even assum-
ing this were true, however, wherever the sales figures 
may have come from they are still subject to the same 
hearsay objection because they were apparently relayed 
to Appellant from "representative brokers" who -...vere 
not called as witnesses in this case. 
Assuming this court affirms the Trial Court's rul-
mg on the hearsay objection, Appellant still has over-
stated the damages he sustained. In paragraph 7 of 
the First Cause of Action of Appellant's Counterclaim, 
Appellant concedes that the foregoing figure should be 
n•duced by the sum of $5,087.50 by reason of sales of 
stock and corresponding cash disbursements made by 
Respondent to Appellant (Record, p. 65). Respondent 
has no quarrel with this position. These cash disburse-
ments were made before Respondent knew that Appel-
lant's check had bounced and were, therefore, normal 
transactions in the account. Commissions totaling 
$152.50 were properly charged on thes(~ transactions. 
By consulting Exhibit 1-P it can be seen that the $5,087 
paid to Appellant represented sales of the following 
shares of stock on the following date: 
Gross Commission Net 
5-18-70 2,000 Investestate $ 240.00 $ 15.00 $ 225.00 
3-18-70 5,000 Inwstestate 600.00 37.50 562.50 
5-18-70 300 Agan Mines 1,650.00 37.50 1,612.50 
5-18-70 500 Agan Mirn~s 2,750.00 62.50 2,687.50 
$5,240.00 $152.50 $5,087.50 
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Since the $5,087,50 was disbursed to Appellant against 
the sales of the above stocks (Record, p. 65) the above 
shares of stock must be subtracted from the number of 
shares actually converted by Respondent. It, therefore, 
appears that the following securities were found to be 
converted by the Trial Court: 
Cl . M:" . ass1c · rnrng ------------------------ 27 ,500 shares 
Investestate ---------------------------- 23,000 shares 
Stansbury -------------------------------- 4,000 shares 
King Oil ------------------------. ________ 2,000 shares 
By subtracting the $5,240, representing cash deliv-
ered to Appellant plus commissions charged on the sales, 
from the total value claimed by the Appellant, the evi. 
dence will support a finding that Respondent converted 
$11,740 worth of stock. By consulting Exhibit 7-P, it 
can be detennined that Appellant, upon the sale of 
this stock, gave Respondent credit in his account at the 
following values : 
Classic 27,500 shares at 131/s cents per share = $3,652 
Investestate 23,000 shares at 6.3 cents per share = 1,449 
Stansubury 
King Oil 
4,000 shares at 7112 cents per share = 1,449 
2,000 shares at 41 cents per share = 820 
$6,221 
Counsel for Appellant stipulated that the foregoing 
prices were the prices Respondent received upon the 
sales of the various securities (Record, p. 129). Appel-
lant testified that in his total damage figure he had not 
subtracted the credit given to his account by virtue of 
the sale of these stocks (Record, p. 259). 
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'l'he Trial Court, in paragraph 7 of its Conclusions 
of Law (Record, p. 79) found that Respondent did not 
haw the right to sell these fully paid securities and, 
therefore, held that the Appellant was entitled to dam-
ages for their conversion (Record, p. 79). rrhe proper 
computation of these damages would be to subtract from 
the $11, 7 40 (representing the value of the converted 
securities) the $6,221 credit given to Appellant on his 
account. The maximum damage figure which can, there-
fore, be awarded to Appellant on his counterclaim is 
$5,519. 
The incorrect figure of $6,430 awarded to Appellant 
by the Trial Judge arose by virtue of the fact that Appel-
lant's attorney stated that the total amount Appellant 
was seeking was the sum of $11,517 .50 (Record 265). 
From this amount claimed by Appellant's counsel, the 
trial judge subtracted the offset of $5,087.50 conceded 
by Appellant in paragraph 7 of the First Cause of Action 
of his counterclaim (Record, p. 65). While this figure is 
supportable on the record because of the inaccurate 
claim made by Appellant'·s counsel ,it does not represent 
the actual damages for the conversion, and this court 
should, therefore, reverse and hold that Appellant is 
entitled to no damages on his counterclaim by reason 
of the improper admission of hearsay evidence. Alterna-
tively, this court should hold that the damage figure 
tihonld be revised to $5,519, the only figure supportable 
hy the Pvidence. 
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POINT IV 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT 
BE INVOKED TO PRECLUDE RECOVERY 
IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant's arguuwnt that the contracts for the 
purchase of securities involved in this ease are unenforce. 
able by reason of the statute of frauds can be disposed 
of by a close examination of Uniform Commercial Code 
§ 70A-8-319, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
This section contains the statute of frauds rules re]a. 
tivP to the sale of sPcurities. Although Respondent need 
fit only one of thE> four exceptions therein contained in 
order to avoid application of the statute, it is interesting 
to note that Respondent can satisfy each of the excep-
tion provisions. 
The first exceptiou is where there is some writing 
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sough! 
or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indi· 
cate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated 
quantity of dPscrihE>d st>curities at a defined or stated 
price. Respondent acted a::; the authorized broker for 
Appellant. Findings of Fact numbers -t, 5 and 6 (Record, 
pp. 76, 77 ). Respondent introduced as Exhibit 4-P its 
form confirmation slip and introduced testimony to the 
effect that such a confirmation slip was mailed to the 
selling broker by U.S. :J[ail, postage prepaid, within 
24 hours after each purchase shown on Exhibit 1-P. 
Exhibit 4-P indicates that a contract ha:s been made 
and states the quantity of securities, describes the same 
and states the price. There is no question but what the 
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writing was signed by the broker in that ~ /OA-1-201 
definPs the word "signed" a:s including any symbol exe-
cuted or adopted by a party with present intention to 
authentic·ate a writing. 
Similarly, subsection (b) is satisfied in the instant 
ease by reason of the fact that delivery of the securities 
was, in Pach case, accepted by Appellant. Under sub-
section ( 1) (a) of § /OA-8-313, delivery to a purchaser 
occurs when he or a J!erson de.-;ignated by him acquires 
pos:-:;ession of a security or under subsection ( c) when 
his hroker sends him confirmation of the purchase and 
also hy hook entry or otherwise identifies a specific 
s<'eurity in the broker's possession as belonging to the 
pun·haser. Acceptance must be presumed by virtue of 
the fact that Appellant did not object, in writing, to any 
confirmations (Record, pp. 222 and 223) as required 
hy § 70A-8-319(c). 
---- If the foregoing were not sufficient ,an analysis of 
.,;uhparagraphs ( c) and ( d) should leave no doubt as to 
the inapplicability of the statute of frauds. In Findings 
of Fact numbers 6, 7 and 8, (Record, p. 77) the Trial 
Court found that between the dates of April 10, 1970 and 
May 18, 1970 the Appellant gave to Respondent various 
onl!'rs for the purchase and sale of securities for Appel-
lant's aef'onnt and that Respondent executed said orders 
in af'cordauce with Appellant's instructions. The Court 
found that within 24 hours after each such transaction 
Rl'spomlPnt sent to Appellant a written confirmation of 
the 1-'Ul<· or purchase and as the securities purchased 
29 
arriwd Respondent specifically identified them as bi 
longing to Appellant by placing the securities in a specia 
folder. Finally, the Trial Court found that at no ti
111
, 
did Appellant send to Respondent a written objection ti 
tlw contents of any of the aforesaid confirmations. Tit, 
conclusion1:J reached by the Trial Court are amply sup 
ported by the testimony of David E. Nelson, an officrr 
and member of the Board of Directors of Responden: 
and a principal of Respondent. Record 221-223.6 Thm 
subparagraph ( c) of ~ 70A-8-319 is satisfied. 
The final exception to the statute of frauds rul· 
is eontained in subparagraph ( d) and occurs where th, 
party against whom enforcement is sought admits in !fr 
pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court that a con 
tract was made for sale of a stated quantity of describe, 
securities at a defined or stated price. In paragraph: 
of the First Cause of Action of Appellant's Counter 
claim, (Record, p. 64) Appellant states that: 
"From the fall of 1969 through June 1970, th1 
defendant had a special cash account with thi 
plaintiff corporation, Account No. 01-182048-009.' 
Upon the introduction of Exhibit 1-P, Appellant's coun 
sel, when asked the nature of the exhibit stated: 
6Appellant appears to be claiming that by introducing each of tl1 
confirmations for the individual transactions Respondent would ha1·, 
been able to prove their receipt by Appellant. However, even hau 
these confirmations been produced, Respondent could not have thereb~ 
proved receipt thereof by Appellant. That these confirmations wen 
received by Appellant is clear from .Mr. Nelson's tes~im~ny that the: 
were mailed to him by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, m the usua, 
course of business (Record, p. 222) and by the fact that AppellaJi 
received all of the monthly statements, summarizing each of the trani 
actions, which he introduced into evidence as his Exhibit D-2. 
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"Its [sic] a computer run of the defendant's 
acco~nt at Prince-Covey, a partial computer run. 
1 thmk maybe the beginning part of it isn't 
there." Record, p. 172. 
Exhibit 1-P contains each transaction involved in 
Appellant's account, and includes the stated quantities 
of described securities at defined or stated prices. Fur-
tlwr, Appellant admits in paragraph 2 of his second 
defense to "having a special cash account with the plain-
tiff. . . . The defendant admits that the plaintiff did 
extent him credit in Salt Lakr County, State of Utah, 
in connection with the purchase of certain securities." 
Record, p. 5:1. Finally, the second paragraph of Appel-
lant's third defense in Appellant's Answer states: 
"Defendant admits ordering securities from the 
plaintiff, admits failure to pay for the securities 
when payment became due .... " Record, p. 54. 
In paragraph 3 of the same defense, Appellant 
includes the following admission: "Defendant admits 
having made orders for the purchase of securities .... " 
Record, p. 54. From the admissions contained in the 
pleadings and in the testimony, it must be concluded 
that Appellant has admitted contracts for the purchase 
of stated quantities of described securities at stated 
prices. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has laboriously reargued the facts of 
this ease und seeks reversal on that basis. He makes 
little <'i'fort to argue the la''' as evidenced by the 
la(·k of authorities cited in his brief. Thr Findings of 
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Fact made by the Trial Court are all supportable lw 
the evidence and so canot be said to be clearly erroneou~. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgrnern 
of the Trial Court should be affirmed in all respect 
except for the $6,430 damages awarded to Appellant or1 
its counterclaim alleging conversion of certain of Appel 
lant's securities. 'With respect to the Appellant's counter 
claim, this Court should hold that Appellant is entitleo 
to no damages by reason of the improper admission ol 
hearsay evidence and, therefore, judgment should h1 
entered for Respondent for $37,435.84 plus interest fro111 
May 14, 1970 and costs. Alternatively, this Court shouhl 
hold that the damage figure of Appellant's counterclaim 
should be revised to $5,519.00 and, therefore, judgment 
should be entered for Respondent for $31,916.84 plm 
interest from May 14, 1970, and costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD, 
MILLER & GELDZAHLER 
Frederick S. Prince, Jr. 
D. Jay Gamble 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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Received two copies of this RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF this -------- day of January, 1973. 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, ESQ. 
466 East Fifth South 
Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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